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Abstract
The paper addresses the question of macroeconomic environment and its impact 
on economic reforms in electricity sector of CEE countries that have become new 
EU Member States and SEE countries. The research is based on the thesis that 
macroeconomic drivers and macroeconomic context of the economic reforms in 
electricity sector considerably differ between developed and transition countries. 
The analysis aimed to test the broadly accepted assumption that regulatory reforms 
and liberalized environment should generally result in cost reflective prices and 
better quality of services. Our analysis shows that the reform results in CEE and 
SEE transition countries have been significantly different. Most of new EU Mem-
ber States have recorded high increase in electricity prices as the result of cost re-
flective tariffs level and gradual phase-out of direct and indirect electricity price 
subsidies. Though these cost-based tariffs have had a positive impact on efficiency 
improvements, they have also harmed social welfare and competitiveness in 
CEECs. On the other hand, most of the SEECs (except Croatia) are faced with low 
collection rates and still have low tariffs that do not reflect costs of supply. The 
other objective of the reform - quality of services has been perceived high in all 
CEECs, while in most SEE countries the quality of the electricity is still the obsta-
cle to business environment. 
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1. Introduction
During the 90s all transition countries started with economic reforms in infrastruc-
ture services, changed the centralized organization of monopolistic infrastructure 
utilities and introduced market-oriented structures and public regulation. Electricity 
sector is specific because of its high macroeconomic significance that arises from its 
substantial contribution to GDP, which directly employs important amounts of capi-
tal, labour and other resources, and indirectly impacts the efficiency and competi-
tiveness of most firms and economy as a whole through the quality and price of the 
electricity. It is a general consensus among economists that efficient and accessible 
electricity services promote economic growth. 
The main preoccupation of the economic policy is to provide cost-effective supply 
for the consumers, the protection of consumers against abuse by monopoly sup-
pliers and investment incentives in electricity sector. Still, there are no conclusive 
evidence on how these economic reforms should be achieved in practice because of 
the variability of macroeconomic and sectoral characteristics in different countries, 
for example market structure, factor endowments and sector performance. The paper 
is based on the hypothesis that macroeconomic drivers and macroeconomic context 
of the economic reforms in electricity sector considerably differ between developed 
and transition countries and therefore the dynamics of the reforms and their results 
differ widely among these two groups of countries. Electricity reforms in transition 
countries were implemented as the part of the much wider transition processes and 
structural adjustment reforms with the goal of achieving higher level of economic 
and social development. The aim of the paper is to analyse the macroeconomic con-
text of the electricity reforms, as well as European regulatory framework that have 
considerably shaped the reform steps and sequencing. Multilateral regulatory frame-
work within WTO and GATS is also considered.
The analysis concentrates on two groups of transition countries: Central and East 
European that have already become EU members and Southeast European that are 
on the way to EU.
The paper consists of six parts. After the introductory remarks, the second part re-
views briefly the theoretical aspects of natural monopoly since transmission and 
distribution networks have a natural monopoly characteristics and regulation as a 
way of intervention in the network business and market to ensure that the pursuit of 
profit does not conflict with social welfare. The third part deals with macroeconomic 
driving forces for the economic reforms, especially regarding the electricity sector. 
The fourth part analyses the macroeconomic framework of the reforms, particularly 
the liberalization and regulation process in European electricity market which has 
strongly influenced the changes in transition countries. The fifth part deals with mul-
tilateral regulatory framework within WTO and particularly GATS that have partly 
shaped the reform processes. The sixth part provides the analysis of the economic 
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reforms in transition countries’ electricity sector, the explanation of key reforms 
steps that have strongly depended on their level of development and the economic 
implications of these changes.
2. Theoretical framework for the electricity sector analysis
The empirical analysis of the electricity sector in this paper is based on theories of 
monopoly market structure since this sector/industry is one with characteristics of 
natural monopoly. Natural monopoly exists when there is great scope for economies 
of scale to be exploited over large range of output and when only one seller emerges 
in an industry. Economic literature agrees that in situation when increasing returns 
to scale cause monopoly to form, regulation may be the adequate government policy. 
Therefore the paper gives a short overview of the important issues in regulation 
theories. 
2.1. Imperfect market structures 
According to neoclassical economic thought that represents the mainstream micro-
economic theory applied today, deviations from perfectly competitive behaviour of 
markets are the result of market failures. Market failures are related to situations 
when a market fails to work efficiently to produce goods or services in a way that op-
timizes benefits to society. There are several market failures well known in economic 
literature with imperfect market structures as the most important. Utility markets 
like electricity market are extreme cases of imperfect market structures or so called 
natural monopolies with only one utility that controls the whole sector. In the case 
of natural monopoly, the long-run average cost of production declines throughout 
the entire market. As a result, a single firm can supply the entire market demand at a 
lower cost than two or more smaller firms. (Tucker, 1997:250) On the contrast to a 
competitive market where there is a clear relationship between price and the quantity 
supplied, the monopolistic market has no supply curve. The output decision of the 
monopolistic firm depends not only on marginal cost, but on the shape of the demand 
curve as well. 
From the viewpoint of society, monopoly leads to effects that are less desirable than 
those resulting from economic competition. Generally, monopoly results in a smaller 
output of goods or services and higher prices than those in competitive industries. 
Another practice associated with monopoly is price discrimination that involves 
charging different prices for the same goods or services to different segments of the 
same market, as it is usual in the case of electricity. 
Monopoly market structure is characterized by a single seller, a unique product and 
impossible entry into the market. In the case of natural monopoly such is electricity, 
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there are extremely high barriers for new firms to enter the market that are related to 
economies of scale. Standard market theory considers that the competition should 
imply a number of producers and suppliers in the different levels of the value chain, 
under the hypothesis that the structure determines the players’ conducts and the ef-
ficiency of the markets (Newberry, 2001). In electricity industry it means that gen-
eration and supply should be horizontally de-integrated among a number of market 
players. On the other hand, the concurrent model of virtual competition proposed by 
the theory of contestable markets (Baumol et. al., 1982) argues that the main goal of 
competition could be simply reached by suppressing the legal and technical barriers 
to entries. Therefore, the industrial structure may be preserved with productive and 
allocative efficiency. In the case of electricity it means that it would be sufficient 
to have “credible threat exerted under these conditions by the foreign competitors, 
which are themselves incumbents in the adjacent national markets”. (Glachant and 
Finon, 2004:133)
High entry barriers in electricity market are also related to the technology used in 
electricity sector. Still, the technological development, namely the development of 
combined-cycle generating technology has lowered the entry costs, especially in 
electricity generation. 
2.2. Economic regulation 
Governments often use economic regulation to modify market behaviour when mar-
ket failures cause markets to behave less efficiently than in the case of perfect com-
petition. According to the theory, in a competitive market, price equals marginal 
cost, while monopoly power implies that price exceeds marginal cost. (Pindyck, 
Rubinfeld, 1998:354) Because of its social costs, government regulation prevents 
natural monopolies to accumulate excessive amounts of monopoly power. In fact, 
regulators induce firms in noncompetitive markets to act in a way that is compatible 
with social goals. Regulatory mechanisms must be established in order to induce 
firms to produce the optimal output with the optimal inputs. The economic regula-
tion enables regulatory agencies to control prices or at least the methodologies un-
derlying their calculation, production, entry and exit terms in regulated sectors like 
public services. 
Price regulation is very important element of regulatory practice because it can elim-
inate the deadweight loss that results from monopoly power. Ideally, the regulatory 
agency would like to push the firm’s price down and to set it at the level where aver-
age cost and average revenue intersect. In such situation the firm earns no monopoly 
profit and output is as large as it can be without driving the firm out of business. 
However, it is difficult to determine these prices adequately in practice and therefore 
the regulation of a natural monopoly can be based on the rate of return that it earns on 
its capital. This is called “rate of return” regulation and it means that maximum price 
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allowed is based on the (expected) rate of return that the firm will earn. (Pindyck, 
Rubinfeld, 1998:357-358)
The traditional textbook theories of optimal pricing for regulated firms have been fo-
cused on second-best pricing and not on incentives to minimize costs or to improve 
service quality. During the 90s in many countries the important part of the reforms in 
electricity sector has included the introduction of “incentive regulation” mechanisms 
for the regulated segments as an alternative to traditional “cost of service” or “rate 
of return” regulation. This view is based on the assumption that incentive regulation 
would provide stronger incentives for regulated firms to reduce costs, improve ser-
vice quality and stimulate efficient investments in the sector.
An important element of the regulation theories considers the imperfect and asym-
metric information problems for the regulators. In other words, regulators should 
be fully informed about technology, costs and consumer demand attributes, but this 
perfect situation does not exist in reality. Regulators have imperfect information 
on regulated firm and moreover, the regulated firm generally has more information 
than does the regulator or third parties. It means that regulated firm may use its in-
formation advantage in order to increase its profits at the cost of consumers, which 
gives the regulated firm a strategic advantage. Most of the literature assumes that the 
regulator’s objective is to maximize a social welfare function and limiting the rent 
that is transferring from consumers/taxpayers to the firm’s owners and managers.
For the last 30 years many economists have argued that process of regulation has in 
fact created monopolistic power and market concentration, instead of impeded them. 
Following the neoclassical analysis of regulation and positive results of deregulation 
in other industries3, policymakers in developed countries have pursued deregulation. 
Concept of “deregulation” has been often used in economic literature for describing 
the process of introducing competition to the electricity market, although the term 
is partly misleading. Deregulation means a reduction of government intervention in 
economic and social systems and therefore a decrease in regulatory activities, which 
is not the case. In fact, process described as “deregulation” is in most countries often 
accompanied by an increase in regulation, so the term “re-regulation” would be more 
appropriate. 
During the last decade processes of liberalisation and globalisation in electricity sec-
tor have modified regulatory framework in all countries, developed as well as tran-
sition ones. The latter have been faced with the inherited inefficiency and losses in 
electricity and electricity firms’ claims to increase the prices in order to reflect the 
costs of service, while the regulators tried to set prices on a lower level. 
3 It is especially so for telecommunications that has also shown naturally monopolistic characteristics. 
(Op.a.)
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Over the years the neoclassical economic thought has been expanded and incor-
porated new ideas of the nature of the firm. New institutional economics has been 
developed and provided with new evidence of the role of institutions in market   
economies. This literature places considerable weight on institutional quality as a 
major determinant of long-term growth. In particular, Rodrik argues that there is a 
requirement for a “cumulative process of institution building to ensure that growth 
does not run out of steam and that the economy remains resilient to shocks.” (Ro-
drik, 2003:25) It especially goes for utility service industries like electricity where 
an effective institutional framework is crucial for sustainable growth in output and 
efficiency. The standard institutional solution to handle these infrastructure industry 
issues is to introduce an independent regulatory agency, operating within a clearly 
defined legal framework. The agency is intended to provide the high-quality institu-
tion that permits and fosters sustained growth in capacity and efficiency in the utility 
service industries, particularly the network elements. (Cubbin, Stern, 2006:115)
3. Macroeconomic drivers for the reforms 
Transition countries have faced similar macroeconomic disequilibria during the 90s 
characterised by sharp decline in industrial production and GDP, high unemploy-
ment, public and current account deficits. Macroeconomic crisis known as transition 
depression has been especially deep for the Southeast European countries (SEECs) 
during the 90s but the year 2000 was the turning point for the economic development 
in these economies and much more favourable macroeconomic environment. Table 1 
shows fiscal and external position of transition countries in the mid 1990s when most 
of them needed to consolidate public finances and 10 years later.
Generally, overall macroeconomic situation has improved in all transition countries 
and most of them have succeeded in stabilizing government balance and government 
debt. In 2005 only Hungary, Croatia and Albania still had government deficits that 
exceed 3 per cent of their GDP. All countries succeeded in decreasing government 
debt up to 60 per cent of GDP, but most experienced strong external imbalances. 
The growing demand has resulted in high increase in imports and current account 
deficit in most countries. According to the high ratios of external debt in GDP of 
almost all SEECs, it seems that these external imbalances have become the main 
challenge to macroeconomic stabilization and sustainable growth in SEE countries. 
The high external imbalances also mean that access to external finance, from FDI or 
international capital markets, should be sustained in order to reduce current account 
deficits and overall debt burdens. Such a macroeconomic situation with increasing 
debt burden and deterioration of the quality of public services have created the need 
for economy-wide structural adjustment programs with the main aim to reduce pub-
lic spending and increase private capital flows into the economy.
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Table 1: Fiscal and external position of CEE and SEE transition countries in 1995 
and 2005 
    (in per cent of GDP)
Country Government balance Government debt Current account External debt
CEECs 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005
The Czech Republic -1,4 -2,6 15,3 30,3 -2,6 -2,1 31,8 36,8
Estonia -0,6 1,6 7,6* 4,8 -4,4 -10,3 17,5 86,7
Hungary -6,7 -6,1 86,4 58,4 -5,6 -7,4 70,9 75,5
Latvia -3,9 0,2 16,1 11,9 -0,4 -12,5 34,6 101,1
Lithuania -4,5 -0,5 22,8** 18,7 -10,2 -7 22,8 47,7
Poland -3,1 -2,4 57,9 42 4,5 -1,5 38,0 43,3
The Slovak Republic 0,4 -2,9 24,6 34,5 2,1 -8,6 30,9 57
Slovenia -0,3 -1,1 18,8 28,8 -0,5 -1,1 15,8 67,2
SEECs         
Albania -10,1 -3,6 68,9 54,8 -7,2 -6,6 27,6 20
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina -0,3 0,7 na na 10,3 -17,3 180,0 28,1
Bulgaria -5,7 3,1 111,1 31,9 -1,5 -11,8 77,4 67,2
Croatia -1,4 -4,1 19,3 44,2 -7,7 -6,6 20,2 78,5
Macedonia, FYR -1,0 0,3 na 47,6 -5,0 -1,3 23,8 39,5
Romania -2,5 -0,8 17,6 19 -5,0 -8,8 18,3 33
Serbia and 
Montenegro -4,3 0,9 na na -11,6
* -10 79,4* 63,8
* Year 1997 
** Year 1998 
Source: EBRD, 2000 and 2006
The infrastructure sector was in a particularly difficult position with state-owned 
and highly bundled monopoly that was strongly subsidised from the state budget. 
The artificially low prices for the electricity and other infrastructure services were 
legacy of the former non-market economy and represented the crucial problem. In 
order to test the hypothesis that electricity prices that are not cost reflective and poor 
payment discipline as the consequence induced the inability to meet the need for 
future investments in the electricity sector, the following analysis shows the extend 
of under-pricing in CEE and SEE countries. 
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Table 2: Electricity tariffs and average collection rate* in CEE and SEE transition 
countries, 1999-2005
CEE COUNTRIES 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
The Czech Republic
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 5,1 5,7 7,3 9,0 8,4 10,3 11,4
Average collection 
rate,electricity (in per cent) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Estonia
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) na 4,3 4,4 5,7 6,5 8,1 9,2
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na 97 97 98 99 99 99
Hungary
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 5,9 6,2 7,0 8,7 11,4 13,5 14,7
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na na na 90 99 99 na
Latvia
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) na 6,3 6,3 6,5 7,1 8,2 8,1
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na na 99 100 100 na na
Lithuania
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) na 6,3 6,3 7,9 9,4 9,7 10,2
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) 90 na 91 90 91 97 na
Poland
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 5,5 5,4 6,5 7,0 7,7 8,5 9,9
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na na na 90 na na na
The Slovak Republic
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 3,5 4,9 5,7 7,1 10,9 13,7 14,9
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na na 102** 95 na na na
Slovenia
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 10 8,9 8,7 9,3 11,5 12,9 13,1
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Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) 99 na na 97 93 na 90
SEE countries
Albania 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) na 3,3 3,4 4,2 5,1 6,2 6,7
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) 58 60 76 93 92 76 74
�osnia and Herzegovina
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 5,7 4,9 5,7 6,0 7,1 6,7 6,9
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) 94 75 95 86 na na 96
�ulgaria
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) na 3,5 3,8 5,2 5,2 6,0 8,4
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) 112 na 85 95 92 92 93
Croatia
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 5,5 5,1 6,1 6,5 8,2 9,1 9,4
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na 93 95 94 95 96 na
Macedonia, FYR
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) na na na 4,1 5,1 5,5 5,5
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) 87 60 80 75 na na na
Montenegro****
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) na na na na na 6,0 5,9
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na na na na na na na
Romania
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 4,1 5,5 5,7 7,0 8,1 8,6 11,3
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na 45 62 96 98 100 99
Serbia and Montenegro***
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) 4,0 1,1 2,0 3,6 5,2 na na
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Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na na 74 84 87 94 na
Serbia****
Residential electricity tariffs
(in US$c / kWh) na 1,1 1,9 3,5 4,7 5,3 5,1
Average collection rate, 
electricity (in per cent) na 79 92 88 90 94 94
Notes:  
*Average tariff paid by residential consumers; where data on residential tariffs is not available, 
average retail tariff. 
Collection rate is defined as the ratio of total electricity payments received in cash and total 
electricity charges. 
**Numbers greater than 100 per cent reflect collection of several years worth of payments. 
***Currently there are three separate Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the Energy 
Community: Montenegro, Serbia and UNMIK. Data according to source data of Transition 
Report 2006. 
*** Data according to web link http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/sci.xls 
(19.11.2007.)
Source: EBRD, 2006
According to the data, new EU Member States have recorded considerable increase 
in electricity prices, especially Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Czech Re-
public. Such heavy electricity price increases and high collection rates, together with 
growing GDP have played an important role in efficiency improvement in these 
countries. On the other hand, the high share of energy expenses of households and 
companies have lowered their welfare and competitiveness. According to Merca-
dos’ report (Mercados, 2007:61), cost reflective tariffs have resulted in restrictions 
of comfort, inadequate heating in households and high share of income spent on 
energy bills in new EU Member States. Situation in SEE countries have been quite 
different since most Southeast European countries with low wages like Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania still have 
very low tariffs that are not cost-based. Prices in Croatia have been increasing sub-
stantially, reaching a level comparable or higher with those found in the new EU 
Member States. The existence of tariffs that are not cost reflective in most Southeast 
European countries have become more acute by the payments arrears and very low 
collection rates, especially in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and 
Serbia and Montenegro. The newest data show that Albania, Macedonia, Montene-
gro and Kosovo under UNMIK still have difficulties with the low level of collection 
rates, while Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (without Kosovo under 
UNMIK) succeeded to solve these problems in the past two years. 
Electricity reforms in the SEE countries have been also motivated by the aim of es-
tablishing regional energy market. In 2002 the European Commission started to en-
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courage these countries in the frame of the Stability Pact to open their national elec-
tricity markets and integrate them with the EU Internal Electricity Market. The most 
important milestone was achieved in October 2005 when the Treaty establishing the 
Energy Community was signed as the only legally binding document. The Parties 
being the European Union from one side and the then 9 Contracting Parties from the 
other (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia FYR, Monte-
negro, Romania, Serbia and UNMIK) decided to create the Energy Community. Re-
lating to the electricity, the Parties agreed to implement the EU Electricity Directive 
2003/54/EC and the Regulation EC 1228/2003 within one year from the entry into 
force of the Treaty. The Treaty has also arranged for cooperation and establishment 
of common regulatory frame for electricity trade across the whole EU and within the 
SEE region under the same rules from the applicable EU Acquis Communautaire on 
energy. Final economic goal of such regional cooperation is creation of larger and 
more stable market, which will be more competitive and more interesting for foreign 
investors. Regarding SEE countries, it seems that the regional cooperation within the 
electricity sector would be a way to avoid “prisoner’s dilemma”. It means if coun-
tries deal with regional public goods individually, without internalizing the effect on 
other countries in the region, it may result in what has been called “the tragedy of the 
commons” or “prisoner’s dilemma”. (Schiff, 2002:11) Everyone loses due to a lack 
of cooperation because costs of providing public goods individually can be large.
Further research within this project will test the hypothesis that the benefits of re-
gional electricity markets are greater than the costs, especially because observed 
countries peak loads do not coincide, and the possibilities of mutual trade increase 
considering existed capacities. In such integrated system costs of huge reserves, 
which are necessary for each country in situation of unplanned increased consump-
tion, or sudden falling out of some producers from system, are decreasing. This 
especially refers to importers such are Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro 
and UNMIK, while Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and UNMIK are 
electricity exporters. Serbia has neutralised its balance. 
4. Liberalisation of the European electricity market
From the early phases of the European integration process, electricity has been the 
important issue for the European authorities and the creation of a single electricity 
market is still one of the most important economic and political objectives. 
Economic reforms that have been undertaken by transition countries during the 90s 
and after 2000 were fundamentally different from liberalisation process in the elec-
tricity sector in old EU Member States. The new EU Member States have entered 
the European electricity market and already took the first steps towards the Euro-
pean model that requires regulated third party access to networks for large custom-
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ers and reduction of barriers to cross-border electricity trade. Still, reforms in new 
EU Member States have been driven by different motives, mostly by the need for 
consolidation of public finances and introduction of private investments, as we have 
concluded in the previous section. On the other hand, the most important driving 
force in developed EU Member States was the need for optimizing economic perfor-
mance in already well-developed sector. 
According to the Mercados’ report (Mercados, 2007:38-39), the 2004 EU enlarge-
ment process involved several processes regarding the implementation of internal 
electricity market that have converged the electricity market and regulatory model in 
old and new Member States:
•	 The technical and operational integration of electricity infrastructures of old and 
new Member States.
•	 Business level integration of companies in old and new Member States.
•	 Legal and institutional harmonisation, including the implementation of the aquis 
communautaire in the field of energy.
Regarding sector and market conditions, the most of new Member States have still 
retained the distorted price structure, which is the legacy of a system in which do-
mestic consumption of electricity was subsidised at the expense of industrial and 
commercial consumption. Some countries still have tariffs that do not allow produc-
ers to recover their costs. (Green et.al., 2006)
It seems that the European internal market for electricity is neither unified nor uni-
form, as said by Glachant (Glachant, 2004:139) and there is no real convergence 
towards a single model. The following analysis will assess the European legislation 
framework for electricity liberalisation.
The real first step towards the liberalisation of the European energy markets was 
made in 1989, but it was only in June 1996 that the European ministers passed the 
Directive 96/92 which gave incentive to the liberalisation of the electricity sector 
in the Member States. (Genoud and Finger, 2004:32-33) The key European legi-
slation to establish the Internal Market of Electricity is the EU Electricity Directive 
2003/54/EC. The directive was implemented by the Member states by 1 July 2004 
and the European Commission was required to carry out a review of their operation 
by 2006. Though this EU Electricity Directive is the key legislation act, there are            
others that set rules in electricity sector: 
•	 Regulation on cross-border trade in electricity 1228/2003/EEC that regulates 
transmission of electricity between Member States,
•	 Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council that con-
cerns measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure in-
vestment.
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In November 2005 the Directorate General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) of 
the Commission published its report on progress in creating the internal electricity 
market (European Commission, 2005) and it found that the most important problem 
on the internal electricity market is the insufficient integration of national markets. 
The key indicators they had used were the absence of price convergence across the 
EU and the low level of cross-border trade. This is generally due to the existence 
of barriers to entry, inadequate use of existing infrastructure, insufficient intercon-
nection between Member States and a high degree of concentration in the industry 
that impeding the development of real competition. According to Thomas (Thomas, 
2006:5-6), here are nine topics the Commission was required to report with the short 
conclusions:
•		Non-discriminatory access
Network access conditions are still not non-discriminatory and fair across all Mem-
ber States because there is at least one aspect of network access in all countries that 
is unacceptable.
•		Regulation
The report concludes that the regulators do not have enough power, they are not in-
dependent of government and their actions are both harmonised across the EU.
•		Interconnection infrastructure
The Commission finds that the availability of electricity network capacity for cross 
border transactions is not satisfactory either in terms of new investment or in the way 
the existing capacity is allocated.
•		Security of supply
This element of the survey is positively marked and the Commission concludes that 
the supply demand balance position is developing favourably in most EU Member 
States.
•		Benefits for small users and households
It is clearly assumed that a high level of switching4 indicates that consumers are 
benefiting from the reforms. Regarding this indicator, it seems that switching is still 
often perceived as risky for the small users and households, although the rates of 
large electricity customers’ switching continue to rise.
•		Market openness and price development
The Commission concludes that some benefits have been achieved, especially the 
10-20 per cent lower electricity prices due to the electricity liberalisation. Still, there 
4  Switching means changing suppliers of the electricity. (op.a.)       
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have been some different opinions regarding this issue. For example the Hall’s study 
(Hall, 2006) argues that this report has failed to support the benefits of liberalisa-
tion.
•		Independence of system operators
According to the Report, unbundling is currently not being implemented in a suf-
ficiently robust manner across all EU Member States. It lists six criteria for indepen-
dence of system operators and in only 13 out of 27 Member States all criteria have 
been met, which means that there is a sufficient level of unbundling called as the 
ownership unbundling. 
In the newest DG TREN report (European Commission, 2007) it is stated that there 
are still problems in implementing internal electricity market that are not just the re-
sult of incomplete implementation of the existing 2003 Directives, but also the result 
of built-in structural and regulatory problems not yet addressed. Even in Member 
States where the current legislation is being fully implemented, problems remain to 
be solved. The Commission’s main objective is to have a complete internal energy 
market with open competition and effective regulation in place by January 2009. The 
measures needed to achieve these objectives include: new rules to avoid discrimina-
tion, the establishment of the European wide regulation functioning, transparency 
and new legislation. 
5. Electricity sector liberalisation within WTO and GATS
Economic reforms in electricity sector seem to be marginally driven by multilat-
eral trading rules and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Relatively 
few commitments for energy services have been made during the Uruguay Round, 
mainly due to the characteristics of energy, particularly electricity sector that is dom-
inated by state-owned, vertically integrated monopolies. Still, during the past decade 
most of the electricity markets in developed and developing countries have been 
restructured and liberalised. The current Doha Round of negotiations accepts that no 
service sector should be excluded from negotiations and a number of countries have 
begun to make requests around trade in energy services. (Eberhard, 2003:5)
The limited impact of the GATS and its obligations for the WTO member countries 
is closely related to the problems of the sectoral classification. The classification of 
electricity and whether it is a good or a service has been a problematic issue for a 
long time. The industry is divided into four main sectors: generation, transmission 
that covers the high voltage network, distribution that covers the low voltage net-
work and supply that includes the sale of electricity to final consumers. Although it 
seems obvious that the electricity generation has the character of a product and other 
three activities are kind of services, it was a problem to define a whole industry. 
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Until the last decade a single monopolistic company in most countries supplied the 
electricity and therefore it was not easily divisible. During the Uruguay Round the 
electricity was classified as a service because it was not storable, though the World 
Custom Organisation (WCO) in Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
system (HS) classifies electricity as a product. It should be noted that the members of 
WCO are not required to classify electricity as a commodity for tariff purposes.
However, since the Uruguay Round most of the countries have been performed eco-
nomic reforms in electricity sector that have included unbundling, i.e. separating of 
the networks operation from the competitive activities. This process was the pre-
condition for the possibility that some parts of the electricity industry (namely, last 
three) be classified as a service and therefore subject to GATS, while the first one 
could be classified as a product subject to GATT. Foreign direct investment in the 
production of energy goods is not the object of the comprehensive multilateral trade 
rules. (Eberhard, 2003: 6) 
The GATS agreement is not restricted to any list of services and there is no agreed 
definition of the term “energy services”. (WTO, 2005:15) Liberalisation of energy 
services is closely linked to the liberalisation of trade in energy goods and in many 
regions there are significant potential for cross-border trade. Market access and na-
tional treatment restrictions to trade energy services are similar to other service pro-
viders. It mostly refers to the discriminatory treatment between foreign and domestic 
service providers, but the ensuring the national treatment commitments are often not 
sufficient to enable the liberalisation of energy services. 
It is worth mentioning that GATS does not require the privatisation or deregula-
tion of any service, but there is the intense pressure from the international financial 
institutions, especially the World Bank, to connect the loans essential for the local 
economy with the privatisation process. (Thomas and Hall, 2006:17) The liberalisa-
tion in whole economy, as well in the electricity sector, was also preferred policy by 
the World Bank and IMF during the 80s and 90s in developing and transition coun-
tries and this neoliberal doctrine has been known as “Washington Consensus”. The 
problem was that the view of Washington Consensus focused too much on structural 
measures aimed at improving efficiency at a microeconomic level and on the belief 
that liberalized markets automatically create competitiveness and growth. In many 
countries it turned out that improved microeconomic efficiency can even go together 
with low growth or recession. During the 90s the role of institutions has been in-
troduced and many economists argue that Washington Consensus doctrine does not 
involve enough social dimensions of development. Speaking of electricity sector, in 
many countries it also turned out that the liberalisation and breaking the monopoly 
was not a practical option.
To conclude on multilateral framework for regulation in electricity trade, it seems 
that this separation between trade rules for goods and trade rules for services is 
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not the optimal framework for enhancing and liberalising the electricity trade and it 
would be more efficient to apply a single and coherent set of trade rules to liberalisa-
tion in the electricity sector.
6. Economic reforms in transition countries’ electricity sector
6.1. Key reforms steps and sequence of reform 
Although there are different models in different countries due to the country and sec-
tor characteristics and macroeconomic conditions, the so-called “standard prescrip-
tion” (Hunt, 2002:15) in developed countries has been transmitted to transition and 
other non-OECD economies. There is a variability in individual reform speed and 
sequencing that depend on different country and sector characteristics and achieved 
level of development. However, these reform steps generally involve the following:
•		Corporatisation of state-owned companies
Corporatisation is the first step and it means the separation of the utility from the 
Ministry that involves at least the creation of clear accounting framework and 
separation of accounts for different parts of the business. Separation of accounts has 
been achieved in most transition countries, but in some countries (Croatia, Serbia) 
governments have retained the final authority to set prices. 
•		Enactment of an electricity reform law (Energy law)
Electricity or energy law is generally recognised as a formal precondition for regula-
tory reforms and establishment of a formally independent regulatory agency. It has 
been adopted in all CEE and SEE countries.
•		Implementation of regulatory reforms
Regulatory reforms are often considered as the most important element of the eco-
nomic reforms in electricity sector. In developed countries it is widely agreed that 
the effective regulatory practice requires the independent regulator whose regulatory 
function is clear and removed from the Ministry. It should set tariffs for those parts 
of the industry that remain a monopoly. However, the governments in most transi-
tion countries still play the important role and have the most important influence on 
final price setting. Results of the survey (EBRD, 2004:56) suggest that only Poland’s 
regulatory agency achieved full independence without interference with Ministry. 
•		Restructuring
Restructuring involves the unbundling of network operation from the competitive ac-
tivities. Profitable parts may be separated for sale to private investors (generation and 
supply), where competitive elements exist, from those parts that are natural monopolies 
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(transmission and distribution). It is obvious that the need for regulation is significantly 
greater for separated (unbundled) utilities than for traditional monopoly utilities.
•		Establishment of a competitive wholesale generation market
The breaking of the monopoly in generation involves some form of competition 
so the generators have to compete with each other to sell their electricity. This ex-
perience seemed to show that independent generators could often provide power 
more cheaply than traditional utilities and seemed to show benefits in breaking the 
absolute generation monopoly of traditional generation utilities. (Thomas and Hall, 
2006:18)
•		Privatisation
Privatisation of state owned utility is final, although the least common step of elec-
tricity reforms. Privatisation has no necessary connection to liberalisation process, 
though the international financial institutions, mostly the World Bank and IMF, have 
made the pressure on developing economies during the 90s to conduct privatisation 
in electricity sector. It has become more clear over the years that changes in owner-
ship may not be sufficient to improve sector performance. Moreover, privatizing 
loss-making state-owned enterprise may improve microeconomic efficiency but may 
result in output losses and increased unemployment. 
6.2. Progress in reforms
In order to evaluate the progress in electricity reforms achieved by transition coun-
tries, we use the reform indexes made by European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD). Generally, Southeast European countries (SEECs) have made 
a progress in the infrastructure reforms, but comparing with more advanced Central 
and East European countries (CEECs) that have already become the EU Member 
States, small countries in the Southeast Europe face significant constraints to infra-
structure regulatory reforms that are related to their limited market size and capacity. 
(Chart 1 and 2)
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These transition indicators cover issues as commercialization, tariff reform, quality 
of the regulatory framework and involvement of the private sector and range from 1 
do 4+, with 1 representing little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy 
and 4+ representing the standards of an industrialized market economy. Most of the 
CEE countries have made improvement in implementing economic reforms in elec-
tricity sector, especially Hungary and the Slovak Republic, reaching the standards 
of developed market economies. Only Estonia and Slovenia have made no improve-
ments in 2005 in comparison with 1999, although their transition indicators in 1999 
have been already graded with 3. 














* Note: Data in 2006 still refer to Serbia and Montenegro as one country.
Source: http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/tis.xls (19.11.2007.)
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SEE countries have been less successful in implementing electricity reforms and it 
seems that progress in electricity reforms has lagged behind other areas of transi-
tion. Economic environment in most SEE countries has been burden with serious 
problems and impediments that have slowed down the pace of reforms in electricity 
sector and chances for the success. Also, until 2006 only Croatia and Macedonia 
have signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement. As we have already stated, 
it is widely accepted in mainstream literature that reforms in infrastructure sector, 
regulatory reforms and partial introduction of the private sector in well-regulated 
and liberalized environment should generally result in cost reflective prices and bet-
ter quality of services. The following analysis will show that the cost reflective prices 
in the case of CEE and especially SEE countries mean the increased prices in order 
to reflect the costs of service. 
One of the legacies of former centrally planned economy refers to the price distor-
tion for households and residential tariffs. Industrial consumers received electricity 
at higher prices than justified according to their relative cost of supply. During the 
90s in most transition countries industrial tariffs used to be higher than or equal to 
residential tariffs. This situation contrasts sharply with that in Western Europe where 
industrial tariffs are on average two-third of the price charged to households, reflect-
ing the relative costs of supplying these two customer categories. (Broadman et.al., 
2004: 171) According to Vagliasindi and Chirmiciu (Vagliasindi and Chirmiciu, 
2004), about the half of the transition countries had major cross-subsidies between 
residential and industrial consumers. However, this situation has been significantly 
changed in new EU Member States. 














Quality of electricity supply
Source: World Economic Forum, 2005, p. 544. 
Nela Vlahinić-Dizdarević, Tomislav Galović • Macroeconomic context of economic... 
366 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2007 • vol. 25 • sv. 2 • 347-371
One of the reform goals is the improvement in the electricity supply as the important 
factor of business environment since the access to competitively priced and high-
quality services determine the competitiveness in the real sector. Successfully imple-
mented reforms in electricity sector are supposed to increase the quality of supply 
and charts 4 and 5 test that assumption. 
According to data, the quality of electricity supply in all CEECs is perceived high, 
especially in the Czech Republic, although its success in electricity reforms has been 
graded with 3.3. It seems that cost recovery and cost reflective prices are much more 
correlated with the quality of electricity supply than the success of implemented re-
forms. It is the result of the fact that one of the most important objectives of the reform 
in transition countries is related to necessity to increase prices and tariffs to cost reflec-
tive levels to enable sufficient maintenance and investments in the system. Slovak Re-
public, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic are four CEE countries with highest 
tariffs, highest quality of electricity and, at the same time, the highest collection rate. 












Quality of electricity supply
Source: World Economic Forum, 2005, p. 544. 
In most Southeast European countries the quality of the electricity is perceived as the 
obstacle to business environment, with the exception of Croatia. The lowest electric-
ity quality is in Albania since this country has been especially affected by the elec-
tricity crisis since 2000. (Broadman et.al., 2004:175) This crisis has been the result 
of the chronic failure to decrease illegal use of electricity, the severe extend of arrears 
and deteriorating hydrological conditions on the predominantly hydropower-based 
system. Kosovo under UNMIK is in similar situation and Macedonia as well sends 
signals that the situation might have similar developments within a year or two.
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7. Concluding remarks
Macroeconomic situation in transition countries during the 90s with increasing debt 
burden and deterioration of the quality of public services have created the need for 
economy-wide structural adjustment programs with the main aim to reduce public 
spending and increase private capital flows into the economy. Electricity sector lib-
eralisation is part of the wider trend toward liberalisation in infrastructure industries. 
Infrastructure sector in transition countries was in a particularly difficult position 
with state-owned and highly bundled monopoly that was strongly subsidised from 
the state budget. The artificially low prices of electricity and other infrastructure ser-
vices that have not been cost-based induced the inability to meet the need for future 
investments in the electricity sector.
According to the empirical analysis, SEE countries have made progress in the in-
frastructure reforms, but comparing with more advanced CEE countries that have 
already become the EU Member States, small countries in the Southeast Europe 
face significant constraints to infrastructure regulatory reforms that are related to 
their limited market size and capacity. Corporatisation as the first step of the reforms 
and the separation of the utility from the Ministry has been achieved in all transi-
tion countries. In all CEE and SEE countries the autonomous regulatory institutions 
have been established and they mostly fix the tariffs independently. In some SEECs 
like Croatia and Serbia governments have retained the final authority to set prices. 
Unbundling of vertically integrated utilities into networks operation and competitive 
activities has been also done. 
Reforms in infrastructure sector and well-regulated environment should generally 
result in prices on cost reflective levels and better quality of services. Our analysis 
shows that the reform results in CEE and SEE transition countries have been con-
siderably different. This is the consequence of different development level as well as 
different institutional arrangements with the EU. 
Most of new EU Member States have recorded considerable increase in electricity 
prices as the result of cost reflective tariffs level and gradual phase-out of direct 
and indirect electricity price subsidies. Though these cost-based tariffs have had an 
important impact of efficiency improvements, they have also harmed social welfare 
and competitiveness of firms in CEE countries. On the other hand, most of the SEE 
countries (with the exception of Croatia) still have low tariffs that do not reflect costs 
of supply. Fiscal situation has become more acute by the payments arrears and very 
low collection rates, especially in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and 
Serbia and Montenegro. The newest data show that Albania, Macedonia, Montene-
gro and Kosovo under UNMIK still have difficulties with the low level of collection 
rates, while Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (without Kosovo under 
UNMIK) succeeded to solve these problems in the past two years. These situations 
reinforce the belief that the social impact of tariff reform should also be the concern 
for policy-makers. The other objective of the reform - quality of services has been            
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perceived high in all CEECs, while in most SEE countries the quality of the electric-
ity is still the obstacle to business environment, with the exception of Croatia. 
The important difference between CEE and SEE countries also considers the timeta-
ble when they have to implement the electricity acquis. Future accessions will hap-
pen against more mature internal energy markets and new accession countries will 
be required to fully implement existing rules before joining the EU. Although only 
Croatia and Macedonia among transition countries have become candidate countries, 
all SEECs have agreed to open their national electricity markets in accordance with 
provisions from the Treaty establishing the Energy Community. It seems that coop-
eration and establishment of common regulatory frame for electricity trade within 
the region could result in creation of larger and more stable market, which would be 
more attractive for future investors.
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Makroekonomski kontekst ekonomskih reformi elektroenergetskog sektora 
u tranzicijskim zemljama1
Nela Vlahinić-Dizdarević2, Tomislav Galović 3
Sažetak
Rad istražuje ulogu i učinke makroekonomskog okruženja na ekonomske reforme u 
elektroenergetskom sektoru zemalja srednje i istočne Europe koje su 2004. godine 
postale članice EU te zemalja jugoistočne Europe. Istraživanje polazi od hipoteze 
o bitno različitom makroekonomskom kontekstu i makroekonomskim činiteljima u 
razvijenim i tranzicijskim zemljama koji su utjecali na tijek reformi u elektroener-
getskom sektoru. U tranzicijskim zemljama makroekonomski i fiskalni uvjeti imali 
su najvažniju ulogu u pokretanju reformi u ovom sektoru. Cilj je ovog istraživanja    
testirati široko prihvaćenu tezu o pozitivnim učincima regulatornih reformi i 
liberaliziranog okruženja na razinu cijena koja odražava troškove te na kvalitetu 
usluga u elektroenergetskom sektoru. Analiza u ovom radu pokazala je da su 
rezultati poduzetih reformi značajno različiti u zemljama srednje i istočne te 
jugoistočne Europe. U većini novih EU članica cijene električne energije značajno 
su porasle kao rezultat troškovnog pristupa formiranju cijena te postupnog 
smanjivanja i ukidanja direktnih i indirektnih subvencija u cijeni električne 
energije. Iako su više cijene rezultirale unaprjeđenjem efikasnosti, one su 
istovremeno smanjile društveno blagostanje i konkurentnost zemalja srednje i 
istočne Europe. S druge strane, većina zemalja jugoistočne Europe (s izuzetkom 
Hrvatske) još uvijek ima nisku naplatu te niske cijene električne energije koje ne 
odražavaju troškove. Kvaliteta usluge kao drugi važan cilj poduzetih reformi, 
ocijenjena je visoko u svim zemljama srednje i istočne Europe te u Hrvatskoj, dok 
u većini zemalja jugoistočne Europe predstavlja ograničenje u poslovnom 
okruženju.
Ključne riječi: ekonomske reforme, elektroenergetski sektor, liberalizacija, tran-
zicijske zemlje
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